

Special Planning Assistant, DD/S

6 July 1958

Chief, Policy and Planning Staff, OC

Annual Report on Wartime Preparation

REFERENCE: DD/S 58-2249, dated 10 June 1958

1. Progress on Items Previously Considered Deficiencies or Problems.

a. Personnel

(1) Our peacetime personnel situation has improved slightly during the past year, although, as will always be the case, our on board strength is not sufficient to take care of all anticipated wartime requirements. In this respect, progress has been made on two fronts:

(a) Civilian Specialist Reserve Program. The Director of Central Intelligence has approved the establishment of the CIA Civilian Specialist Reserve on a pilot basis. As a result, the Office of Personnel recently allocated 35 spaces in the pilot program to the Office of Communications. In response to this, a list of former communications employees has been drawn up and submitted to the Office of Personnel so these individuals may be contacted, as appropriate, to determine if they are interested in the proposed reserve program.

(b) The Department of Defense has approved a mobilization force to provide for Agency military personnel requirements in the event of a general emergency. For the Office of Communications, the M-Day plus 6 months authorization consists of the current detailed

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(2) The possible effects of nuclear warfare on our communications activities are difficult to predict. Nevertheless, wartime T/O's have been revised in light of the best information presently available. In general, we have followed the policy of staffing presently existing or definitely planned communications activities sufficiently to handle the anticipated workload. Where exact requirements are unknown, we have planned for one or more groups which can be deployed as required. These groups, together with personnel from activities which cannot be activated because of specific wartime conditions, will provide some flexibility in meeting unpredictable situations.

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4. Alternate Bases.

The Office of Communications continues to keep in touch with the discussions taking place on this subject. Although many of the problems relating to alternate bases are far from resolved, a complete review has been made of world-wide communications equipment stockpiling. This review has taken into consideration the latest available war planning information and has resulted in recommendations that various changes be made in stockpile distribution. Some of these changes have already been carried out.


2. Accomplishments, and Current Status of Significant Activities.

a. Staff Communications.

(1) Domestic Emergency Circuitry - Domestic emergency circuits are available to provide alternate communications facilities for the following Agency and non-Agency requirements:

- (a) Backup circuits for the Headquarters (CIA) Signal Center
- (b) Presidential Redline Telephone Service
- (c) Special Inter-Agency Circuitry
- (d) Emergency Communications for the FBI
- (e) Emergency Communications for the Department of State
- (f) Emergency Circuits for FBID
- (g) Emergency Circuits for GCI/OSI

(2) Intra-Agency Emergency Communications - Domestic Intra-Agency circuits have been provided for the following Agency requirements:




(3) Support of CIA Wartime Circuit Requirements by the Department of Defense - In order that the Agency may continue in time of war to remain in contact with its world-wide field stations, the various components of the Department of Defense have been requested to provide communications outlets to overseas points through their relocation sites. [redacted] The Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force have accepted CIA circuits for this purpose and have provided certain other necessary support.

(4) Full details of all emergency circuitry are available in the Office of Communications.

(5) Active networks, which have a definite wartime value, are in operation [redacted]. In addition, emergency staff communications networks are maintained in Europe and North Asia. With a few exceptions, each station in these emergency networks is manned and checked out at regular intervals.

(6) There are [redacted] at the Chief of Station's house and the Deputy Chief of Station's house [redacted]. These stations are intended for warning messages in case of an attack which would disable the normal facilities. In case of evacuation, the stations would remain [redacted].

(7) Arrangements have been made for the [redacted] to call upon the [redacted] radio facility [redacted] for support in case of war. That command presently has a transmitter installed in the [redacted] facility for contacting the Seventh Fleet.



(9) The Office of Communications continues to maintain a training facility which could be expanded to meet wartime staff training requirements.

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(3) Other programs which may have application to war planning are in the process of formulation, or have been initiated, but have not progressed sufficiently for reporting at this time.

3. Major Problems or Deficiencies

a. Alternate Bases

(1) As was mentioned in last year's report, this is a matter on which the Office of Communications can take only limited, independent action. However, in the preparation of wartime T/O's, and the programming for world-wide stockpiling of communications equipment, consideration has been given to the planning of other Agency elements as well as to the latest available information on possible wartime situations. When considering a dispersal of assets, the associated budgetary problems are tremendous, as are also those of manpower, support, logistics, security, etc. In many cases all that can be done at this time is to keep in touch with developments and maintain as much flexibility as possible in stockpiling, wartime T/O construction, and other aspects of war planning.

(2) The status of as an alternate base remains essentially unchanged. It is generally agreed that it is not a desirable location, but thus far it has not been possible to find a more suitable place within the limits imposed by budget, technical requirements, political considerations, etc.

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(3) In regard to [] it is the desire of the Office of Communications to locate there a small radio station which could be used to meet certain area requirements and expanded to handle emergencies such as the possible loss of [] Previous efforts along these lines have, for various reasons, been unsuccessful. Now, however, in view of the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, the Office of Communications is renewing attempts to obtain permission to negotiate for a radio base [] or vicinity. If these efforts ultimately result in the establishment of [] radio facility, Agency communications in this part of the world will be on a much more secure footing.

4. Estimate of Wartime Communications Capabilities of the Agency

a. World War II Type Conflict

Assuming present assets remain available, meeting of Agency staff and clandestine communications requirements appears to be mainly dependent upon how successful we are in staffing our wartime T/O under prevailing conditions.

b. Nuclear War Involving Wide-Spread Destruction

The difficulty of predicting the extent and severity of damage under nuclear war conditions, makes it equally difficult to estimate the human and material resources which might be left for carrying out Agency communications responsibilities in the staff and clandestine fields. However, it seems safe to say that communications capabilities would be greatly reduced. In planning for such eventualities, attention has been given to dispersing emergency equipment as widely as possible and to maintaining flexibility in the deployment of personnel.

c. Our present staff communications position is essentially the same as a year ago. We are in a position to take normal traffic volumes in stride, but not in a position to handle emergencies, such as the recent one in Southeast Asia, without the redeployment of personnel and the utilization of overtime. Crises of this sort have thus far been met successfully by these expedients. A more widespread and quick-breaking emergency would tax us severely until our personnel could be augmented and redeployed. However, it is believed that at least essential traffic could be handled during the initial period of a wartime situation.

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